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Neuroscience can't show us the source of free will, says Philip Ball, because it's not a scientific concept.
Gluing a fly's head to a wire and watching it trying to fly sounds more like the sort of experiment a naughty schoolboy would conduct than one that turns out to have philosophical and legal implications.
Posted by Nicola Jones on May 16, 2007
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Great article. I quite agree that 'free will' as a concept is so ill defined itself, and relies on yet more ill defined terms like 'self', that it is scientifically unhelpful. It seems quite proper then that the term 'free will' never appears on Brembs's paper; only in the press coverage of it.
Posted by: Chris Surridge | May 16, 2007 09:46 AM
I just sent the following email to Philip Ball before I came here:
--------
Dear Philip Ball,
thank you very much for your thoughtful article!
Personally I think you are spot on with all of
your arguments, even though you are clearly
critical of our use of the term "free will" in the
press release. And I must say that I agree with
you 100% that "free will" is not a scientific
topic and that's precisely the reason we don't
mention the term in the paper.
However, neuroscientific findings will not be
without influence on the debate about free will,
just as chemistry and psychology have never been
without influence on our views and attitudes
towards love and life.
Scientific findings influencing these topics at
the dinner table, cocktail party or in philosophical
discussions are what keeps science alive and in
contact with the general public. The few findings
with such effects explain why scientists are doing
what they are doing and can galvanize public
support for science and stir debate.
I personally think there are plenty of more
reasons, why linking the biological basis of
spontaneous behavior to the notion of free will in
a press release is justified. However, I find the
ones above already sufficient.
Again, I think you covered the story very
intelligently and the article is exceptionally
well-written and raises many the important
aspects.
Thank you very much for spending so much thought
and energy on our modest work.
Best wishes,
Bjoern
--------
Great minds do seem to think alike, Chris! lol :-)
Does this mean we had no other choice than to think the way we did? :-)
Posted by: Björn Brembs | May 16, 2007 02:50 PM
‘Will’ basically denotes the power of choice and deliberate action or the intention resulting from the exercise of this power (1). As Chris Surridge points out the study cited does not mention this term and rightly so, because fruit flies could never have any intentions or deliberate actions, simply because they lack consciousness. To me this is valid no matter if we acknowledge the presence of order in their spontaneous behavior or not.
As Dr. Eric R Kandel from the Center for Neurobiology and Behavior at Columbia University has stated ‘free will is exercised unconsciously, without awareness’ (2) and the big question is: ‘is one to be held responsible for decisions that are made without conscious awareness?(2).
Dr. Philip Ball is brilliant in his irony about the excuses people put forward when held accountable for their actions. One might think that humans have evolved these mechanisms of defense so they could prevent depression, ergo ‘the evolution made me irresponsible’ but recent research from Ulrich Orth and colleagues from the University of Berne shows that shame rather then guilt is maladaptive (3).
Personally through, the scene in 'Good Will Hunting' when Sean (Robin Williams) repeatedly says to Will: ‘It's not your fault’ will always move me like no other scene.
Finally, the‘culturally useful’ compassion of a physician’s to his or her patients, who (no matter what) just cannot stop smoking, just cannot stop eating or just cannot stop being afraid could well make him or her better a physician. And who knows, one day maybe even a better scientist.
(1) Webster's New World College Dictionary, Third Edition, 1995
(2) http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_5.html
(3) Orth U et al. Self-conscious emotions and depression: rumination explains why shame but not guilt is maladaptive Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2006 Dec;32(12):1608-19.
Posted by: Ivan Boyadzhiev, M.D. | May 16, 2007 05:29 PM
Dr. Boyadzhiev,
Your argument above hinges in part on your assertion that flies don't have consciousness. However, you present that as a given, without any attempt to carry your reader with you. A question for you: Starting from bacteria and going all the way to humans, just where do you draw the line between conscious and non conscious organisms? Are all mammals conscious for instance, or only humans?
Generally, the whole debate on consciousness (in humans) turns on the difference between what a human says he experiences - subjectively, and what the scientist theorises about his experience by studying him objectively. As we can not ask a fruit fly what she thinks about being glued to a wire or anything else for that matter, there is even less chance of understanding her ranking in the consciousness stakes. For the moment, as far as the fruit fly is concerned we are left only with the objective data. We should therefore guard against jumping to our own subjective conclusions.
Posted by: Mark Ravelle | May 16, 2007 06:55 PM
So if there is no free will in science you can say the same about love et cetera. Cant you?
Posted by: Johnm | May 19, 2007 06:43 PM
Of course "free will" does not exist! The physical deterministic universe doesn't magically NOT govern your brain. Still an interesting hypothesis, the illusion of free will may be nothing more than sequential/state logic where result of inputs can only be reflected or not at all many state changes later.
Posted by: Tadema | May 20, 2007 03:04 PM
By using specific definitions, free will and determinism are both true.
Free will is definied as a process of choosing among alternatives by maximizing the value of the expected consequences. This means that I can choose whatever I "want." The values can include external, cultural, pharmacological, intrinsic, genetic, deduced, strategic, romantic, risky, whimsical and random considerations that have been internalized and are retrieved into the choice process.
Consciousness in humans includes an ability to explain the reasoning and values that are the basis for the choice (possibly post-rationalizations).
Determinism is true when looking at the external inputs, with the free will process as a transfomation box, and the actions of choice as the output. Whether there are random elements is not important. Without complete knowledge of the transfomation process, the determinist will always have error when predicting the outcomes.
For example, I have an intrinsic value not to cause pain to myself. However, when I see a sliver in my skin and have a sterile needle, I will override this value with the reasoning that a little pain will make me healthy and choose to remove the sliver. By setting up different situations, determinists will be able to predict when I will choose to remove a sliver or not. However, the free will process is still at work, so I always do what I "want."
Recent neural studies support the existence of this free will process, with identified centers for several options in a choice situation, along with logical processes that accept or reject external emotional loadings.
Determinism does not remove responsibility for actions. Laws and punishment make sense in terms of the model described above. Threatened punishment for breaking laws is an external input that sways the free choice towards legal behavior. Failure to carry out the punishment (in society or in the home) removes the external threat and the desired influence on behavior.
Until I find an earlier reference that takes this position, I will have to claim authorship for this attempt to reconcile the positions.
Posted by: Dr. Kent Quisel | May 22, 2007 04:14 AM
Chris Surridge is of course quite right to say that “free will” is never mentioned in the Brembs et al. paper itself, and I know he’s far too scrupulous an editor for it to have been otherwise. But the reason free will was mentioned in the press coverage is that Brembs et al. raised it in their own press release. Without that, I doubt that anyone (including me) would have made the connection.
I’m aware that this might all sound as though I am critical of the authors for having done so. Far from it; in fact I applaud them. It is a very stimulating, and perfectly reasonable, perspective on their conclusions (which are interesting even without this added speculation), and I agree with Björn that such speculations play a useful role in provoking wider debate. That I’m not persuaded of the applicability here of ‘free will’ in the normal sense of the word doesn’t mean that I don’t think it was valuable to raise this notion. Indeed, it would be good if more scientists were willing to stick their necks out like this.
Posted by: Philip Ball | May 22, 2007 09:34 AM
Introducing "free will" into French penal law under the guise of "responsibility" has proven catastrophic. Under the Napoleonic Penal Code (1806) an act committed under the influence of serious mental illness ("démence") could not be qualified "criminal", and the author could not be judged (he was as a rule commited to a psychiatric hospital by administrative order). Under the New Penal Code enacted in 1992 by the then Socialist government, the act is criminal, but judge or jury have to assess the "responsability" of the author. Result : prisons are full of obviously out of place obvious mental patients, because responsability is a philosophical concept which neither psychiatrists nor judges can appreciate.
Posted by: Jean-François Foncin | May 22, 2007 02:31 PM
I thank Mr. Ravelle for his thoughtful remarks and criticism on my post.
Selective attention is a testable component of consciousness (1) and a recent study of visual selection in Drosophila has shown that several properties of selective attention are represented in the fly brain (2). Hence I'm always excited to find out about any study that examines key changes in behavioral responsiveness of Drosophila melanogaster and I've never doubted it as one of the best study models when exploring consciousness. The study done by Björn Brembs and colleagues further supports this.
Certainly though, the notion whether fruit flies have consciousness can only be entertained philosophically (3) and if we assume that consciousness is self-awareness, then flies are very unlikely to be conscious in the sense that we humans appreciate the concept (3).
Philosophers of mind such as John Searle and Thomas Nagel ascribe three dominant features to awareness: subjectivity, unity, and intentionality (1). Mr. Ravelle’s considerate remarks relate to its first feature seen by Searle and Nagel as its defining characteristic and the characteristic that poses the greatest scientific challenge (1). My comment though focused on the third feature of consciousness, namely intentionality, because I think it is the most pertinent to the idea of ‘free will’. It addition, it is the feature I believe to be the most relevant to the individual responsibility and the danger that legal responsibility could be eroded.
It would be unfortunate if neuroscience ultimately reshapes our intuitive sense(s) of justice (4). On the other hand it could make people more empathetic and less prone to making judgments, which lack tolerance, compassion and objectivity. It is why I strongly support Mr. Ravelle’s final statement.
(1) Kandel ER et al. Principles of Neural Science, 4th ed. 2000 McGraw-Hill, New York
(2) van Swinderen B, Greenspan RJ. Salience modulates 20-30 Hz brain activity in Drosophila. Nat Neurosci. 2003 Jun;6(6):579-86.
(3) van Swinderen B The remote roots of consciousness in fruit-fly selective attention. Bioessays. 2005 Mar;27(3):321-30.
(4) Greene J. & Cohen J. J. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 359 . 1775 - 1785 (2004).
Posted by: Ivan Boyadzhiev, M.D. | May 22, 2007 06:36 PM
First a conscious experiment: Put dots A, B,C and D visibly on a flat surface.To "see" whether they are on the points of a square or om those of a trapezium sufficient information must be acquired from each dot, and BROUGHT RIGOROUSLY TOGETHER. For if the information of A, of B, of C and of D were in separate say space-time locations, no location would have sufficient information to solve the problem. But apart from "dead-alive" cats and like from quantum mechanics (or even Chesire cats from Wonderland?) each point, or even each object in the material world is fully saturated with the information defining that point or object, so it has no room for information about any other point or object. (Acquiring other information would simply make the object a new, different object) So no material instrument can solve it. The peak information in a digital computer is but one bit, and that is too little!. So a conscious image is metaphysical, requiring a being that is a perfect unity (not made of parts). Such a being cannot die biologically since it lacks parts which have to be re-arranged to cause death. This leads to the conclusion that the material world is incapable of "konwing" relationships, and so "laws" and so depends for its existence on an Intelligent Being, God. And I do think that this is good science.
Posted by: Percy N. Kruythoff | May 22, 2007 07:18 PM
(in two parts, sorry)
Dr. Boyadzhiev and others raise interesting topics in the consciousness/freewill arena worth focusing on.
1)Definition of consciousness.
This often includes self-awareness, but as awareness is almost synonymous with consciousness, we have here a circular definition: "Awareness includes self-awareness". This is not made any easier by the fact that the word "self" is not readily defined, and if pushed most investigators would include awareness as a property of the self. For this reason I prefer to use the word sentience.
2)Mental unity.
This is a very difficult concept. Even within a single individual there would appear to be varying levels of mental unity depending on the occasion. It could be said that on a day when mental unity is at a peak, awareness can be said to be "expanded". However, this also implies that awareness still exists in beings who exhibit very little unity, but awareness is "reduced". The question is - how far can we see this unity being reduced until we can say that a particular entity is not conscious. It may well be that a single transistor has an infinitesimal -but real- amount of awareness.
Posted by: Mark Ravelle | May 23, 2007 06:11 PM
(part two)
3)In the above cited paper (Björn Brembs et al), a mathematical treatment is given to support apparent "spontaneous" behaviour in fruit flies.
Clearly, Spontaneity is being used as a proxy for "free will". However I would argue that we should first make up our minds as to whether mathematics, being a deterministic process, can ever produce a yes or no answer as to whether something is non-deterministic or not.
4)Randomness/Spontaneity.
In the laboratory there are two types of random number series available for use:
Psudo random numbers generated by an algorithm running on a computer. These can be generated very quickly and are useful for certain types of testing, but due to the fact that they are the result of a deterministic process, their sequence can be entirely predicted if the starting condition is known.
Posted by: Mark Ravelle | May 23, 2007 06:19 PM
(part three)
"Truly" random numbers generated by some natural process - for instance thermal-electrical noise in a resistor, or more classically - timing the interval between particle emission from a radio-isotope.
In comparing short sequences, it is not possible to tell the two types apart. during longer tests, the algorithm generated numbers will eventually repeat, whereas the physically generated ones will not. Thus the definition of randomness appears to hinge on unpredictability.
By using random numbers as inputs to a man-made neural network, a slight jitter could be added to the network's decision making. For instance if the entire brain and nervous system of the Drosophila fruit fly were to be simulated on a computer, as well as the blank surroundings mentioned in the paper (Björn Brembs et al), then our computerised fly would always initiate movement to the left (say) every time the simulation was run.
Posted by: Mark Ravelle | May 23, 2007 06:33 PM
(part four, sorry it was so long)
However, by adding a random number stream to some of the weights in the network, spontaneous behaviour would appear to emerge. If the random numbers were in fact psudo random, that "spontaneity" could be predicted. If the numbers came from a noisy resistor or radio-source, that behaviour would be unpredictable - I believe that in time the system could be tweaked to mimic a real fruit fly to the satisfaction of most biologists. But will the model ever feel "yes I am a fruit fly" ?. If we managed to model a human in this way, she might even speak and say "Yes, I am alive". But would we believe her?
Going back to the determinism versus free will argument (3), I assert that no program running on a conventional computer can ever generate unpredictable behaviour without some external random input from a physical source. The reason for this is that microprocessors are entirely deterministic. If your otherwise reliable computer crashes occasionally - it is caused by cosmic rays flipping a 0 to a 1 when it shouldn't have...
Posted by: Mark Ravelle | May 23, 2007 06:35 PM
thank you very much for your thoughtful article!
Posted by: Oyunlar1 | May 24, 2007 03:47 PM