A new study challenges the notion that post-9/11 rules which placed stricter limits on pathogens research stymied scientific productivity.
In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, and subsequent anthrax mailings, the US government instituted tougher controls on research into human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins that could be used for nefarious purposes.
The USA Patriot Act in 2001 and the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act in 2002 required researchers studying these “select agents” to improve security in their labs and take other seemingly costly measures to keep microbes out of the wrong hands. The laws also required extensive background checks of scientists involved in the work.
A 2010 study by Elizabeth Casman’s team at Carnegie Melon University found that the cost of doing research on anthrax rose from an average of $59,000 per published paper to $333,000, after the laws were passed, while research on Ebola ballooned from $71,000 to $167,000 per paper. Meanwhile, the cost of working on a pathogen that didn’t come under such heavy regulation, Klebsiella pneumoniae, actually declined after 2002. See Nature’s coverage of the paper here.
Casman’s team also noted that that more scientists started working on select agents after 2002, largely because of boosts in biodefence funding.
A new analysis by Kevin Wright at the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID) and posted to the agency’s Funding Blog contends that new research projects, not costly regulations, explain much of the drop in productivity.
Focusing on NIAID-funded research on Ebola, anthrax and K. pneumoniae, Wright compared new research projects begun after 2002 with projects that were underway when the laws were passed. Ongoing research on anthrax and Ebola, he found, cost no more than work on K. pneumoniae. New projects, no matter the pathogen, cost far more than ongoing projects. Wright also found a premium for new select agent research, which cost up to twice that of new K. pneumoniae research.
The comparison with Casman’s PNAS study isn’t perfect because Wright’s study looks only at NIAID-funded research published since 2002. Casman also wonders if the NIAID study filtered out research on select agents that wouldn’t have come under the bioterror laws. “We spent a lot of effort deleting papers that did not require the physical possession of select agents (and would not be bound by the same high security standards),” she says.
Whatever the actual cost of the select agent rules, scientists working on them seem to feel overburdened – a point reflected in interviews Casman’s team conducted. “There was a common refrain among the scientists that the security rules had added significant cost in material and time to their daily activities,” she says.
For more, see our recent Q&A with a virologist says she who abandoned some of her research because of the new regulations.
Image of colour-enhanced micrograph of Bacillis anthracis bacteria via Wikimedia Commons. Chart courtesy NIAID.