The September Editorial in Nature Medicine (14, 891; 2008) addresses the difficulty of monitoring biosecurity research, in the context of the increase in biosecurity spending in the US to $41 billion per year, almost ten times larger than the amount spent before 9 September 2001. In the wake of the Bruce Ivins affair, the Editorial notes that a consequence of the increased funds available for biodefense is that there are now so many people working in this field (perhaps 14,000 individuals) that monitoring their activities is not adequate. From the Editorial:

Aiming to fill this void, the BWC [biological weapon convention] countries have held annual meetings since 2003 to promote “common understanding and effective action” on a series of biosecurity issues agreed upon in advance. For example, as this issue of Nature Medicine went to press, the 2008 meeting was taking place in Geneva, with a focus on measures to promote biosafety and on oversight, education and development of codes of conduct to prevent misuse of advances in biotechnology. Regrettably, again at the insistence of the US, the participants of these annual meetings do not have decision-making authority, raising serious doubts about their real influence.

Deciding on the right level of regulation for dual-use research, both at the national and international levels, is a difficult problem. Scientists should continue to get involved in the decision-making progress to make sure that their point of view is heard until clear guidelines are in place. If the outcome of this domestic discussion is successful, it may provide a blueprint for a global regulatory scheme—a sorely needed opportunity for the US to lead by example.

See also a related News story in the same issue of the journal Nature Medicine 14, 893 (2008).

The Nature journals’ policy on biosecurity is here, with links to associated (free to access) Editorials providing context for the policy.