Nature Medicine | Spoonful of Medicine

The best defense against biowarfare

The recent suicide of vaccine researcher Bruce Ivins, the FBI’s prime suspect in the fatal anthrax mailings following the 9/11 attacks, has brought bioterrorism back to the forefront of the national consciousness. Many people are pondering out loud: Is the US prepared to respond to a bioweapons attack? Probably not, according to recent media reports. The government has invested some $50 billion in biowarfare research since 2001, which has gone into creating new labs, building up stockpiles of antibiotics and smallpox vaccines, and devising strategies for large-scale distribution of these medicines. Yet despite considerable progress, there is still work to be done; we still don’t have a suitable anthrax vaccine, for example.

Congressional investigators have expressed concern that the recent proliferation of biowarfare research facilities might actually increase US vulnerability because more people have access to dangerous materials, which generates more opportunities for accidents and abuse. There are currently some 14,000 people working at about 400 laboratories authorized to study certain ‘select agents’ — dangerous viruses, bacteria and toxins, some of which could be weaponized, The New York Times has reported.

But I think the more people conducting research in this area, the better. Chemical and biowarfare attacks are likely to happen regardless of how hard we try to thwart them. Much of the scientific information required to make bioweapons is freely available on the Internet; synthetic DNA can be mail-ordered with the click of a mouse. Our best defense against biowarfare is to cultivate a vibrant biomedical research community with agile response capabilities. We need biosensing systems that can rapidly detect dangerous particles in the environment, fast tests for identifying pathogens, along with new vaccines, antibiotics and antivirals.

Stockpiling medications is not sufficient; we need better techniques for designing and manufacturing the medicines, as it is impossible to anticipate every potential biowarfare scenario. (To get an idea of the number of potential agents we are dealing with, check out the select agents list compiled by the feds and you find everything from the familiar botulinum neurotoxin to the mysterious “Lumpy skin disease virus.”)

The best step the US government can take to prevent abuses and accidents is to cooperate with its international partners to create an effective oversight framework under which this type of research can flourish safely. This, unfortunately, has not yet happened.

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Comments

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    Girish Kotwal said:

    The perceived bioterrorism threat from the usual suspects (Al Qaeda and Saddam)was extremely exaggerated and hyped since 911, by an administration that was eager to gain public support and justification for the Iraq war. On the positive side, it did lead to research support of a few scientifically sound projects and led to better preparedness against some (albeit,highly unlikely) threats from smallpox. Contrary to the intelligence (?) agencies, bioweapons require sophistication and training that is only available in the developed/industrialized countries and it is no surprise therefore, that the only bioterrorism in the past 60 years or more, originated and occurred in the USA, post 911. Secondly, the impact of 911 and other explosive devices related terrorist activities have a more dramatic and immediate impact than bioterrorism, which makes people more panic stricken. Dr. Ivin’s alleged involvement in the anthrax dispersal resulting in the deaths of 5 individuals is going to make the nonMicrobiologists (especially the FBI and the Homeland security)extremely and unfairly suspicious of Microbiologists (even though they may work on harmless microbes)and make life even more difficult with increased crippling restrictions and regulations that it will drive them away from pursuing work with infectious agents. After 911, it became very difficult and impossible to acquire reagents from across continents, even after doing all the paperwork and following procedures. Statistically just 5 deaths (with due respect to the families who lost these precious loved ones) from bioterrorism in more than 60 years is a drop in the ocean of deaths from all other causes. The disproportionate funding of a perceived threat when there are real and proven fatalities taking a heavy toll on humanity, not only from disease but from wars, gun violence and accidents does not make too much sense. I feel one of the ways to avert future bioterrorism is to restrict the research on select agents to just one or two highest security and containments centers (as has been done in the case of smallpox stocks)and not to spread them across several laboratories. Researchers who wish to pursue research in such centers should be allowed to do so by going to such centers. Of course, whatever motivated Dr. Ivins to be involved, if in fact there is credible and indisputable direct evidence (not circumstantial) for him to commit such a serial murder using anthrax needs to be investigated. This will avoid such acts by future custodians of the most dreaded microbes.

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    Rubab said:

    Most harmful things is availability of these scientific information required to make bioweapons on the Internet; synthetic DNA can be mail-ordered with the click of a mouse.. anyone with little knowledge can use these information to make bioweapons..