Reviewing a mythbreaker

MythMythbreaker: Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw and the Story of Indian Biotech

Although I study the biotech industry, and mostly startups, I didn’t know the full story behind Mythbreaker. There will be many parts of the book new to other readers too, as the author, Seema Singh, has done some fantastic digging. What emerges is that Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw, the focus of the book, has beaten by a long shot the odds of a first-generation woman entrepreneur. She has also beaten (again, by a long shot) the odds against succeeding in India in a highly technical area.

The book can loosely be divided into three parts. In the first, we get the story of Kiran herself. The second gives us the evolution of Biocon, India’s largest biotech company. The third part is the growth of Indian biotech in general and its ecosystem.

It is clear that Kiran is hugely self-confident, tough, down-to-earth, tireless, ambitious, adventurous, resilient, unconventional, highly intuitive, a risk taker and a go getter with chutzpah. Here are a couple of stories from the book: Once, in the early days of Biocon, Kiran had to take a train journey.  The doors of the compartment were jammed full of people, but she needed to make that train and had family members and co-passengers “push and pull” her through a window. Second, around 1990, Kiran made a presentation to the much larger firm Unilever, and laid out three types of companies: those that make things happen, those that watch things happen, and those that wonder what happened.

Biocon is the first type, she said. Unilever the third.

Somebody once told me that when Kiran wants to cook a novel meal, she makes sure that the dalroti is ready in case the thing flops. So her risks are calculated, but nevertheless, she’s taken big risks. Still, the book is light on material from Kiran’s life, and Biocon’s evolution fills the pages.

It is indeed an incredible story. To start in a garage with an apron on, personally handling fish maws, and progress to a point at which Pfizer, the largest pharma company in the world, pays you a $200 million upfront in a partnering deal is impressive. This journey is recounted in this book with enough detail as to be educational.

The book also covers the industry itself. I live in Bangalore, which is also where Biocon and the author Seema are based. We Bangaloreans like to assert that the city is the biotech capital of the country. I have personally seen how many high-tech start-ups there are in the city now. Kiran has been the force behind many of the initiatives that have supported them, especially – but not solely – in Karnataka.

This section also includes the galling comment by Charles Cantor, at Columbia at the time: “Indians are good at learning [science] but they don’t deliver.” Certainly Kiran delivered in India, and so have others. It is not at all certain that Cantor would have, and it’s certain he has not faced the manifold difficulties that our entrepreneurs have faced.

Mythbreaker is a must read for anyone interested in the Indian biotech industry, or part of any course on biotech entrepreneurship in the country. A sequel needs to be written, about 15-20 years from now. I hope Seema takes up this project. She knows the background to the story that is currently unfolding and the thoroughness to dig up all that is needed to tell a compelling story and the ability to hold our undivided attention.

Gayatri Saberwal

 

Clinical trials and beyond

peepsFor previous blogs on Australian biotech, go here, here and here.

Australia is well developed concerning clinical trials. The regulatory body, the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), trusts the high ethical standards of the doctors and the ethics committees of the hospitals. Therefore, first-in-man trials do not require TGA approval, and can be done after notifying the regulators. Also, the protein for trials can be manufactured in a Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP)-like facility that is not fully GMP. (A GMP facility needs to comply with the regulations and be registered with the TGA in order to obtain the label, but a GMP-like facility doesn’t.) This makes it easy to do clinical trials in Australia. Further, the data generated from clinical trials in Australia are considered to be at par with that from the US or Europe. Clinicians running the trials are also paid much less than their peers in the US.

The country is also fairly innovative. In a 2013 Innovation Survey, Australia was ranked 13th in the world, and between 2003–2013, the per capita and per GDP dollar IP filings from Australia were more than that of most developed countries.

Yet problems remain. Overall, while human resources in Australia are less of a challenge now than they used to be two decades ago, the pool of people with experience remains small. There is a whole series of missing skills related to IT and data mining, IP, commercialization and regulatory affairs. Once a company has grown it can easily hire people who are accustomed to revenue and know how to increase sales, but in the early stages one has to put together a story and make people believe in it, and this is not easy to do in Australia. The experienced managers, or advisers, are mainly returning Australians or foreigners with commercialization experience in the US or EU. Also, the advisers might be located overseas. Notably, sourcing and retaining Americans is a challenge.

Another problem: the country has not yet produced a first-in-class drug. The only notable commercialization story is that of the key patent behind the cervical cancer vaccine Gardasil. The technology was discovered at the public University of Queensland, and clinical trials were financed through the sale of some of the patents to an Australian medical company, CSL, and later Merck. Currently, Merck has the exclusive global license to sell Gardasil, except in New Zealand and Australia, where CSL owns the license. But generally, a successful company is one that developed a simple product, repositioned existing products or developed new delivery systems for existing molecules, and did not build upon cutting-edge science.

Yes, biotech in Australia has its challenges. However, the science is good, government programs are supportive and clinical trials are relatively easy to initiate. Also, pioneers of earlier years have shown what it takes to build a successful company. Keep in mind that it can be done, but do not expect to go the whole way alone.

Szymon Jarosławski and Gayatri Saberwal

Acknowledgments: This article is based on interviews with 14 senior people in, or associated with, companies in Australia, whose comments have been edited for clarity and brevity. We are extremely grateful to the interviewees, who gave freely of their time and their insights.  This work was supported by a grant to GS from the Institut Merieux, France. SJ was supported by France Volontaires, France. Neither organization played any specific role in this study.

Fueling Australian biotechs

fuelWe’ve blogged here and here on the Australian biotech scene. In this post, we’re going to look at collaborations and finance.

Australia is strong, scientifically. The quality of its research is well above the world average and just below the average European citation rate. The country has sharp science and international academic connections. Specifically, Australia has strong links with the UK and the US, due to a common language and also because of the tie with the Commonwealth. China is also a big collaborator.

A common language is not enough, however. Australia suffers from geographical isolation and some members of Australian biotech firms travel every three months.

Large multinational companies as partners (or investors) help bring validation to Australian biotechs, just as they do elsewhere in the world, but Australian companies often accept unfavorable terms because they need a global brand and wide distribution. While CEOs often realize they need to reach global markets, they sometimes do not appreciate which product is likely to succeed globally (though this has been somewhat alleviated in recent years by an influx of senior executives from the US or the UK, or from Australians returning from abroad). Collaborations are helpful for Australian biotechs to get drugs through the FDA, and many companies decide to open an office in the US to generate US-derived data for the FDA, as well as for access to the US capital markets.

Financing

Finance is, of course, of critical importance to young companies, and there are interesting facets of the Australian financial ecosystem.

Angel investors. In Australia, biotech angels tend to be people with backgrounds in the biosciences, and they guide and help the firms they invest in. The association of individual angels, BioAngels, tends not to invest in drug development due to the high cost, but to focus on devices and diagnostics. They invest around A$60,000-A$250,000 per company. In general, they select opportunities that can scale up 7–30 times in 5–7 years so that the few that succeed will provide good returns overall. As elsewhere, angels do not look kindly on VCs, who tend to bring in shareholding agreements that override the angels’ earlier agreements with the company, not to mention dilute initial investors down to small percentages of ownership.

Venture capital. Table 1 has a list of active Australian VCs. Australia also had the Pooled Development Fund, a venture capital fund that invested in enterprises valued at less than $50 million. Although new registrations under this program are no longer possible, income obtained by holding, or disposing of, shares in this fund is tax-exempt. Also, in recent years, Australian VCs have syndicated with US VCs to increase the size of their funds.

Earlier in the Australian industry’s history, a company might conduct an IPO, raise $10 million and have a valuation of $20-$30 million. Things have improved somewhat. In 2013, for example, stem cell company Regeneus raised A$10.5 million in its IPO, giving it a market cap of around A$46 million. It’s a sign of maturity that there are much fewer listings on the ASX today.

Table 1. Major VCs that have invested in the bio-medical sector in Australia.

Bioscience Managers
Brandon Capital Partners
GBS Venture Partners
Innovation Capital Associates
NBC Capital
OneVentures
QIC Bio Ventures
Starfish Ventures
Terra Rossa Capital
Uniseed
Yuuwa Capital

Source: Australian Private Equity & Venture Capital Guide.

Up next: clinical trials and Australia’s unique skillset

Szymon Jarosławski and Gayatri Saberwal

Acknowledgments

This article is based on interviews with 14 senior people in, or associated with, companies in Australia, whose comments have been edited for clarity and brevity. We are extremely grateful to the interviewees, who gave freely of their time and their insights.  This work was supported by a grant to GS from the Institut Merieux, France. SJ was supported by France Volontaires, France. Neither organization played any specific role in this study.

Australia’s government and biotech

topIn our last blog post, we laid out the Australian biotech foundation and a few of its shortcomings. Here we focus on what it has done well.

Certainly biotechs can be built successfully in Australia. One company (Acrux) grew from a $20 million market cap to $500 million over 15 years, and another (Mesoblast) grew to be worth $2 billion. Australia is doing many things right.

Partially this is because the government has played its role well. Initially Australia’s government looked at biotech as a lucrative export opportunity, and it put in place a grant system and tax benefits for anyone investing in high-risk start-ups. For instance, companies with less than $20 million in turnover yearly can get a 45% tax refund on eligible R&D expenditures (more information here).

Some of the other government initiatives have been the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF), since closed; the Innovation Investment Fund-Follow-on (IIFF), also closed, and the Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, which offer tax breaks for limited partners. Pre-Seed plans helped create the first batch of biotech entrepreneurs, and today the government still strives to make things easy – it can take just minutes and less than $1,000 to do the paperwork to set up a firm.

The government has also invested large sums in infrastructure made available to the public on a fee-for-service basis. The National Collaborative Research Infrastructure Strategy (NCRIS) program provided $542 million from 2004 to 2011 for subsidizing infrastructure in private drug discovery firms and contract research organizations (CROs). NCRIS has in some cases subsidized the cost of installing/purchasing advanced biotech infrastructure in private CROs or R&D biotechs with a CRO wing.

State governments have also helped to create a few clusters. In Melbourne, for instance, the government of Victoria has supported the development of The Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research, Burnet Institute, The University of Melbourne, Monash University, Royal Melbourne Hospital and the Royal Children’s Hospital – many of which are in close proximity to each other. Clusters allow companies to share facilities and draw a better hiring pool. Clusters also help promote collaborations, and sometimes consortia formed in a cluster may earn state government funding.

Australia has a unique system of about 60–70 public collaborative research centres. Called the Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) program, it supports end-user-driven research collaborations to address major challenges facing Australia. The CRC Program links researchers with industry to focus R&D efforts on progress towards utilisation and commercialization. In 2014–15, there were 35 CRCs in a range of areas such as healthcare, natural hazards management and the aerospace industry.

Most biotech start-ups originate from these centres, meaning the spin offs have essentially been financed by public universities. There is no regulation on who owns an invention – the scientist, their department or their organization – and thus the company founder and inventor have been able to own IP rights rather cheaply. This has changed, with most universities adopting the equal splitting of IP rights among 3 parties: the research organization, the relevant department and the inventor scientist.

Thus, some 75% of the companies that are on the stock market are university spin-offs. Yet, partnering with the institution that spun out a company is the most common collaboration for a start-up, because the university expects that money will be pumped back to it through fee-for-service work from the spinout. This is often the cheapest way to get things done for a startup, but it is hardly ideal, as academic scientists often do not feel comfortable working in a fee-for-service arrangement and being told what they should do, nor do they understand the pressure of time and the corporate work culture.

Next post: Finance

Szymon Jarosławski and Gayatri Saberwal

Acknowledgments

This article is based on interviews with 14 senior people in, or associated with, companies in Australia, whose comments have been edited for clarity and brevity. We are extremely grateful to the interviewees, who gave freely of their time and their insights.  This work was supported by a grant to GS from the Institut Merieux, France. SJ was supported by France Volontaires, France. Neither organization played any specific role in this study.

Building biotech in Australia

KoalaAustralia has grown a busy biotech sector, but what awaits bioentrepreneurs in this small, geographically isolated country? 

The Australian biotech industry was born in the 1980s, after researchers at the Walter and Elisa Hall Institute in Melbourne discovered colony stimulating factors (CSFs). However, that discovery was left unpatented, and it was Amgen that earned billions from drugs based on the technology. This was not the last mistake made by Australia’s biotech sector, but even with the larger issues that plague it today, Australia has a long list of native benefits to offer and one of the world’s more robust biotech sectors. Over a series of blog posts, we’re going to discuss what one should consider before launching a biotech in Australia.

First, the downside

Historically, the mining industry has been an important contributor to Australia’s gross domestic product (20% in 2014), so the country has a long legacy of risky investments. But in biotech’s early years, Australia’s investors often didn’t understand the risks associated with drug development, and many didn’t understand the difference between research and development – putting in just enough money to finish the research, but leaving nothing for development.

Another mistake concerned going public too early. The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) has a low bar for listing, and thus is amenable to smaller companies. A company with a post-IPO market cap of A$10 million can list, something unseen in the US where a firm needs to be worth $100 million before listing. This sounds like a positive – a more forgiving public market – but Australian firms are forced to go public early because of a weak venture capital (VC) environment in Australia. As of 2014, Australia’s 88 ASX-listed biotechnology companies were valued at more than A$51 billion. Without suitable market caps, many of these companies are unable to raise additional funds.

The VC environment, as a percentage of GDP, is far behind the US. The Australian government is aware that private VC money is inadequate and attempted to fill the financing gap through programs such as the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF), where funding was matched by private investors, and Commercialization Australia. As of February 2014, Commercialisation Australia had invested A$213M in 503 companies, but the program was abolished in May of that year.

This shortage of angel and VC funds means that the early Australian sector is dependent on government tax breaks and R&D grants to help generate funds. That helps, but many firms fail because they lack enough money to reach a critical size, and because of a dearth of experienced managers.

Australia also suffers from too many tiny biotechs. The vast majority of university technologies would be better off licensed out, rather than formed into a start up. These small biotechs are often left floating, poorly capitalized and without strategic direction. Many would benefit from merging, but that’s not as common as it should be, as management often doesn’t have great vision and are more concerned with the continuity of their salaries than the firm itself.

Australian bioetchs often suffer from unfocused development, in that they do not ask the go-or-no-go questions early enough. The reason, it’s been suggested, is that if a CEO doesn’t have shares in a company, he or she won’t have a wholehearted interest in its success, and thus considering shutting down the company simply imperils the CEO’s job. Yet another aspect is that those very small companies are founded on a single invention, which means that ending a project basically ends the company. Furthermore, given the full disclosure requirements of public companies, announcing the stoppage of projects would likely crush a company’s stock price. So companies soldier on and drag out their failure. Millions of dollars have been wasted this way in Australia.

There is another issue: for an industry to be viable long-term, of course, shareholders must make money, but even when this does happen in Australia, there haven’t been enough success stories to encourage reinvestment, so money is rarely recycled. Often, if a company fails, the CEO cannot raise funds for another.

It’s true there are a handful of good firms with nice stories, such as Mesoblast, Sirtex Medical, Impedimed and Clinuvel Pharmaceuticals, but medium-cap Australian stocks have been pounded on the exchange (Table 1), even as stocks in the US have flourished. So while Australia has companies that are providing employment and are profitable, it has room to improve.

Next post: what Australia has done well

Szymon Jarosławski and Gayatri Saberwal

 

Table 1. Market damage in 2014 (Go here for this article by Mark Pachacz in full; it has been excerpted below.)

Pharmaxis, which at its peak had a market value in excess of $900 million, saw its stock fall by more than 50% in 2014, as the company’s lead product for the treatment of cystic fibrosis failed to gain substantial market traction in Europe.
Acrux’s share price fell by 55% in 2014, amid concerns emerging about the use of testosterone products and the inability of the company’s product to secure a more substantial market share in the US through its partner, Eli Lilly.
QrxPharma received a red light once again from the US Food and Drug Administration for its pain combination therapy. Its share price plummeted by 98%.
Alchemia’s shares fell 85% after its Phase III cancer trial showed no benefit over placebo.

 

Acknowledgments

This article is based on interviews with 14 senior people in, or associated with, companies in Australia, whose comments have been edited for clarity and brevity. We are extremely grateful to the interviewees, who gave freely of their time and their insights.  This work was supported by a grant to GS from the Institut Merieux, France. SJ was supported by France Volontaires, France. Neither organization played any specific role in this study.