China’s Biotech Future

chakma globeContinuing our interview series with life sciences venture capitalists to accompany a study on venture capital in emerging markets published in the March 7th, 2013, issue of Nature Biotechnology, we return to China. Our third interview is with a venture capitalist, who wishes to remain anonymous, from the one of the most prolific early-stage life sciences investors in China (14 innovation-focused investments to date). Previous posts are here and here.

 

 

How much early-stage life sciences activity is there in China, and who is driving it?

China always goes by the five-year policy plan set by the Central Government. We are in our 12th five-year plan, and one of the clear initiatives is investing in innovative science, and one area specifically relates to life sciences, medical devices and new drug discovery. A year or two ago, many cities started moving toward establishing biotech parks, life sciences parks – initiatives similar to efforts in the internet sector early on. The government is pushing scientific research in universities, but the quality of the research – whether it is innovative enough compared to the United States or Europe is another question. I think there is some catching up.

Most of the brightest researchers in China want to go abroad. That was the trend 10 years and 15 years ago. There is a reversal with a small group of talented life sciences researchers coming back due to the economy in the United States and Europe not doing well. These people are becoming involved in copy-cats, improvement of old drugs, and some purely proprietary discovery work.

The local government is incentivizing these returnees or sea turtles by providing them with facilities. Not much of this research has originated from China’s universities or research institutions. Most of the work is sourced from the proprietary knowledge of returnees who have been educating in leading foreign universities. The researchers see the opportunity of being backed by the government, so they come back and start their own companies. There are some licensing deals, but these are mostly occurring in Hong Kong and Taiwan. But the knowledge that they’ve come back with is dated by 5 to 10 years, and is probably already behind the United States and Europe, where science and technology advance much faster.

There is a clear critical mass of leading scientists who want to build up the capabilities of Chinese universities similar to what we see in the United States. I’m not sure that is happening yet. People move because of money. Singapore has tried to attract a lot of talent by buying them to build its BioPolis hub, and they have been doing it for over 10+ years. The results have been so-so. People come and go, and they never really got good results. In 5 years, I predict nothing much will change.

 

If innovative science is still emerging, what are venture capitalists investing in?

Most healthcare venture capital funds typically have a 10-year life, and are allowed to invest in the first 5 years, with the last 5 years for harvesting. They have to identify opportunities in China that fit into their own timeframe. This means being revenue and profit-driven. There’s nothing wrong with that, investors look for returns, and for companies like WuXi PharmaTech. Their model is clear – US-dollar revenue and RMB costs, that’s an easy mode, so a lot of investments have been made into CROs. However, the CRO space is saturated, and typically the first three leaders pick up the most market share.

The hottest thing is in pharmaceutical and medical device distribution. It’s valued more than technology because even if you have a so-so product, you can still push your product and sell, and make a lot of revenue. If you have a world-class product, but you don’t have a channel to the doctors, then you are just going to sit there until the copy-cats come, in a few years.

In our own portfolio, most of the entrepreneurs went abroad and then returned. Very little IP is sourced from China. Virtually all of it is in-licensed from abroad. Certain studies are still being done in the United States and Europe, and part of the development is being done in China to take advantage of the lower costs. The cost advantage of development in China is still very apparent even though it is narrowing due to currency depreciation, as well as the rising cost of the people.

 

What advice do you have for potential life science investors in China?

My advice would vary depending on the fund mandate. If your fund’s mandate is really growth and returns, then you need to identify such models in China, which are not difficult to find. Right now, whoever captures the distribution channel basically captures the bulk of the value. In fact, if you look across all industries, whoever controls the distribution channels has the dominance in that sector. The key thing is how to negotiate with management. You have to really identify a management team that can deliver, and sometimes the scientist isn’t the right person.

Don’t invest in early-stage technologies unless you really think that you are a very, very long-term investor. If you’re not a long-term investor, go with the China-distribution model with a very good management team. Firms such as TPG and Carlyle initially wanted to do more early-stage investments, but came to the realization of where most of the returns were and started participating in IPOs.

Justin Chakma

Not Invented Here

fortress

Pharma has been accused of not looking beyond the fortress walls. Are VCs now following suit?

Business development professionals have long complained about the difficulty in convincing Big Pharma research groups that a new project from outside their company  is worthy of consideration.  This is called Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome and, when displayed by pharma, is characterized by skepticism of novel ideas, a focus on data gaps rather than an assessment of the data that exist, and an unwillingness to abandon internal projects even if corporate portfolio valuation standards favor the external project.

Big Pharma has made strides toward erasing this bias toward internal projects. Even before the recent R&D downsizing inside pharma, an increasing percentage of its pipelines was derived from licensing or acquiring outside projects, and most large companies expect 50% or more of their products to be sourced externally. Business development groups have enlarged and a variety of mechanisms have been set up to access external innovation, such as corporate venture funds, academic center collaborations, “innovation centers” and incubators.

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Insights from India

chakma globeContinuing our interview series with life sciences venture capitalists (here for previous post) to accompany a study on venture capital in emerging markets published in the March 7th, 2013, issue of Nature Biotechnology, we turn our eye to India. Our second interview is with Aditya Kapil, who was a principal at VentureEast at the time of our interview in 2012.

VentureEast is one of the pioneering life sciences investors in India, having made 15 life sciences investments from a $40 million fund raised in 2004. A second life sciences focused fund targeted at $200 million closed in 2012; it has made 3 new investments.

What is your fund’s investment strategy?

Aditya Kapil: There have been some changes in terms of strategy with our second fund. Broadly, we looked at three life sciences-driven sectors – healthcare, food & agriculture, and cleantech – but what will change is that the amount of money  we will invest in pure innovation deals or pre-revenue deals will be much less this time around, due to the size of the fund. We did drug discovery, typically biotechnology-type deals in our first fund (6 out of 16 were early-stage drug discovery companies). It is unlikely we’ll have such a high exposure to things like that, with maybe 10-15% of the fund going to things like this. Another change is that our focus will be on India. Last time we had companies, which were outside India, and those companies had to have an Indian angle. Meridian has a drug for head & neck cancers, and only the clinical trials were done here. This time, all of our companies will be based out of India, because the life sciences space has changed significantly.

What types of innovation and deal flow do you see?

AK: There is a lot of deal flow in the early-stage life sciences, and we basically showed that there are a huge number of early-stage companies that are being funded by government. Several of those companies are coming to us for investment, which comes straight out of India. We have become known as life sciences investors, so we see a disproportionate number of deals. It’s a mix of CSIR-funded labs, and in-licensed technologies, as well as technologies within larger companies. The generics companies are realizing with competition from China that generics are not a long-term strategy, but listed Indian companies are averse to having a high R&D spend because the stock market punishes you for that. There are schemes where a larger company with an innovative project can get capital with four-year moratorium loans.

It’s slowly gaining traction – technology transfer processes are maturing and beginning to mimic the kinds of terms that you would find in the United States. Before, the university would have a one-time payment and those payments were paltry compared to the return to the company, but now you have milestone payments based on development as well as royalties.

What are some challenges in the Indian biotech landscape?

AK: Exits are challenging. In one instance, we were trying to sell one of our drug assets to a listed company in India via a share swap to avoid dilution. It took 14 months to execute on this deal and educate the company, so the M&A market is not very mature. The IPO market in India is very simple. You need revenue to IPO.

The Indian FDA is not the greatest in terms of quality and negotiating with them can take a very long time, and they don’t really understand the science behind a novel chemical entity. Even if you can get the drug past them, it’s very difficult to persuade physicians to prescribe, as they are happy with the drugs they currently use, and they rely heavily on big branded names. I don’t think India has made enough strides in normal drug discovery for it to be credible with local physicians. The marketing costs are very high. You could have a partnering strategy, but Indian generic companies are risk averse, so even in a partnership you would need to put in several million dollars.

What sorts of therapeutic areas are you interested in?

AK: Reformulation has becoming extremely easy, so we’re interested in modified generics in cardiovascular disease and diabetes, where India has some of the highest prevalence rates in the world. If I was looking at a new chemical entity, I would focus on the global market, and particularly oncology, where the need is much greater, and even a marginal increase in therapeutic value will result in a huge increase in the valuation of the company.

Are CROs becoming increasingly involved in innovation?

AK: As the competition for the CRO market has grown from China, and ‘big pharma’ has decided that it does not want to pay by the full time employee (FTE), CROs have begun to take on work that look like biotech/pharma deals. The pharmaceutical company provides an upfront payment and milestone-based payments, where the Indian company takes on risk, starting with targets and going all the way to pre-IND. This allows them to increase their fee from $90,000 per FTE to $250,000 per FTE, and allows the CRO to get paid in 18 months despite the risk being far lower.

What can government do to help replicate APIDC-VE’s success?

AK: Replicating what we did might be a good start, where the provincial government (Andra-Pradesh) was a 49% stakeholder in the original fund. What’s funny is that APIDC-VE was successful because something went wrong – the World Bank institute liberalization in 1992 or 1993, which led to the privatization of APIDC-VE, allowing it to have an entrepreneurial dynamic. But can you replicate this model?

I’m not sure you can replicate this model in a hurry. VC funds sponsored by the government have sprung up, but there is much lower team motivation. I don’t think the government understands exactly what they have to do. It takes a lot more work than throwing some money together with a group of people. We have the advantage of team longevity, and excellent performance. Our first fund had a 42% internal rate of return.

The reason why we are changing our investment style is that while $200 million is a small fund in the United States, it is a medium-sized fund in India, which is causing our deal size to increase to $8-10 million per company, and reducing our ability to do seed-stage investments. We’re still looking at innovation – we’re thinking of investing in a Phase 3 oncology asset out of Philadelphia.

How do you source your investments?

AK: Historically, deal sourcing couldn’t be through a network because there was no network in those days. In 2005, I went to the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) conference in the US, and I literally went through more than 1,000 abstracts from the booklet they send you once you registered, and I shortlisted 100 projects that were not too academic, and not too large-company like – projects that I thought were in the sweet spot of venture capitalists.  I did cold emails and then got 12 of them to take appointments with me. Out of those 12, we made one investment. It was an important investment because that company had two different US venture capitalists (VCs), and that opened up US VC networks.

Today, we participate on the boards of India’s research institute incubators, and one partner has participated in a sub-body of the Department of Biotechnology. This is a full-fledged proprietary network that other VCs cannot access. Our deal flow today is unbelievable. Our total deal flow over the first fund was 320 deals, and we received over 320 deal proposals upon announcing this new fund, with about 85% of them direct contacts without an intermediary. So our effort from the first time has paid-off.

How does due diligence differ in India?

AK: Most companies are family-run, and there are cultural issues. Family-run businesses don’t like drag-along clauses or selling their shares, so we spend a lot of time talking to teams, and ensuring their interests are aligned with ours in terms of control and exit. The classic US term sheet is not executable in India as the family will not play ball with liquidation preferences from preferred shares, or pay to play clauses. Due diligence is also very difficult because documentation of data is not good. It’s more difficult to check the robustness of the science. It’s not because the quality of thought is poor. It’s that the rigor is not that great. What challenges do you face legally and culturally in negotiating term sheets? What are the major aspects in which the term sheets differ in emerging markets (information rights, liquidation rights, anti-dilution protection)?

Who are the entrepreneurs that are starting companies?

AK: It’s typically vice president or project-level people that have been in Indian companies for a long time, and are now willing to start their own thing. One of our entrepreneurs was the head of marketing at BioCon. They are the people who understand, but they are still a rare commodity in India. It’s slowly changing.

Justin Chakma

 

Life Science Venture Capital in Emerging Markets: a View on China

chakma globeAs part of a study on venture capital in emerging markets published in the March 7th, 2013, issue of Nature Biotechnology, my colleagues and I interviewed several life sciences venture capitalists operating in emerging markets. In the coming weeks, we will be sharing some of the insights from these investors here on Trade Secrets.

Our first interview is with Dr. Jonathan Wang, senior managing director at Orbimed Asia Advisory, the Asian off-shoot of OrbiMed, the world’s largest dedicated healthcare investment fund. OrbiMed Asia Advisory raised its first $185 million fund in 2008. It announced plans to launch a second healthcare-focused of $300 million in October 2012. In this interview, Dr. Wang describes OrbiMed Asia’s investment strategy and the state of early stage life sciences innovation in China.

What sorts of investments are you looking for?

I have been looking for early stage and innovation-focused biotechnology companies in China, but we have not invested in any [as of early 2012]. It’s not because of any lack of interest, because innovation-focused companies will be a very important portion of what people will invest into in the future. For now, they are still nascent, with very few companies doing high-quality innovation, and fewer still, receiving investment from venture capitalists.

Why are there so few early stage innovation deals?

If you ask me why there are such few deals focused on innovation and drug discovery, it is because of the comparative attractiveness of low-risk deals that already have products or revenues, and in some cases, are even profitable. Early stage development involves very long-term investment, high financing requirements, and talented people who can execute. It also involves development capabilities in China, and global standards such as GLP facilities, which are very young. There are many reasons why innovation deals are so few today.

Still, some early deals are happening today. Hua Medicine is one example. The scale comparatively is a lot smaller than more mundane types of revenue-stage investments. The key question is whether innovation and early stage deals are going to become mainstream investing. That’s anybody guess, as you can imagine that it is a very dynamic process. Both the question and the answer are quite fuzzy, but some of the major factors include:

  1. Talent. We need the right people who can develop drugs – somebody who has developed drugs for 10 years at Merck and can take advantage of local resources. We need more talented peoples especially at the managerial level.
  2. Standards. We are still learning about drug development and implementation of standards such as GLP and GCT are early, and need to become more robust.
  3. Time. We need time to take a compound from the library to drug lead to drug candidate to preclinical studies. It takes years.
  4. Cross-Border Licensing. We need partners to develop these compounds.

What is the role of government in the life sciences industry?

Government is playing a very positive role for supporting the life sciences industry. It’s doing a very good job. Essentially, for a deal to be invested in, we must have government support in most cases. I might still do the deal if the company by itself looks good, but typically in China, government provides support. This support comes in the form of cheap or free facilities, local tax benefits, and many grants (county-level, city-level, province-level and national-level).

Do you have interest from foreign venture capital funds?

We have huge interest from foreign funds, but there are some hurdles. Currency is the biggest hurdle. When you have a foreign currency, it is difficult to invest in local companies. Government is trying to establish policies to make it easier for foreign funds to exchange their currency into RMB, but that process has not happened in a robust way. To exchange local currency, the company might become a joint venture, but lose its status of being a purely domestic company and the accompanying government support, although that’s less the case now.

What do the limited partners in China look like?

For Western funds such as OrbiMed and KPCB, the limited partners look very similar to other funds in North America. They are endowment funds, pension funds, fund of funds and banks. Inside of China, the situation is quite different. There are many small mom and pop RMB funds, managing $50 million or less, with backing from high-net-worth individuals, local companies and governments. These LPs lack experience in understanding how a LP should support a fund. For example, in the West, you draw down money from limited partners over time as you need it, and don’t store it in your entire fund. Sometimes, LPs in China will not follow through, and answer draw-downs creating trouble for funds, so some funds will draw 100% of their fund down at the outset. The LPs also sometimes want to be the general partnership of the fund as well and play an active role in investing. In the West, the general partnership has investing autonomy.

What advice do you have for prospective investors in Chinese life sciences?

First, you need to have the right people who understand the local environment. Second, you need to understand that the decision-making process is different. In the United States or Canada, deals are clean, and you don’t have to worry about the government, assets or hand hold the company as much. In China, a lot of deals are dirtier, requiring more involved decision making, because they focus more on the local market needs and low cost, as opposed to being innovation focused. Third, developing a strong brand is key in order to attract the right deal flow.

Justin Chakma

More on the Shelf

In my last post, I wrote about shelf registration filings among small cap biotech companies. I defined a small cap biotech company as one engaged in drug development with a market capitalization of less than $1 billion. Often referred to by their SEC form designation, S-3, shelf registrations are prospectuses that allow companies to issue securities at any time within three years of the date of filing. Data from the past four years, specifically second quarter of 2010 to second quarter 2012, revealed that approximately 1/3 of US small cap biotechs use S-3 shelf registrations. Of those, however, around 80% of shelf-filing companies subsequently employ them, i.e., sell securities and raise additional capital, though the timing and the size of the first financing varies considerably. Thus, a company’s decision to put a shelf in place does indeed foreshadow a likely future financing, usually within six months.

I gathered a lot of extra data in conducting that analysis. Several readers put forth follow-up questions, which I address here. My database includes new shelf filings as recently as the end of Q2 2012, so many of the S-3s under consideration are still active. I should note that in the two months since I last wrote, numerous public companies have raised money by drawing upon securities registered in their S-3s. January 2013 was a particularly robust month for fundraising in the biotech sector. I’ve updated my data to account for the recent financings through January 2013.

@biotechbaumer asked, Would be interested to know how stock trades post S3 filing until the financing event(s) occurs.” 

Similarly, John Dyer of advisory firm Aquilo Partners asked, What’s the normalized stock price reaction (filing + one day, + 5 days) to a shelf filer? and “What is the normalized return of shelf users from filing?”

These are great questions, as they address both the market’s initial reaction to a shelf filing and the ability of an S-3 filing company to raise money at higher prices.

Looking first at short-term price movements, I examined the percentage change in share price one day after the S-3 was filed. For the 268 new S-3 filing made between Q2 2008 and Q2012, the average change was -1.5%, but there was wide range of -24.3% to +34.3%. The majority of 1 day price changes were negative; specifically, ~67% of S-3 filers experienced share price decreases the day following their shelf filing. The full distribution is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Of course, one day stock movements can be strongly influenced by overall market conditions on the same day. To account for this potential confound, I looked at the concordance between the one day stock movement for the S-3 filer and the one day movement of the NASDAQ Biotech Index (NBI). In the scatter plot blot below (Figure 2), when I plotted the percent change in S-3 filer stock price one day after filing versus percent change of the NBI that  same day. The data are pretty noisy, but I think it’s fair to say that the relationship between the two price movements is weak, which indicates that when the markets are up, the S-3 filer stock price is not necessarily up, as well. Further, if one creates a 2×2 matrix of price movements, it’s clear that even on days when the NBI is up, stock prices of S-3 filers are mostly down. Rarely is the converse true.

Figure 2

As I wrote previously, S-3s provide a mechanism to sell securities opportunistically. The hope, of course, is that if S-3 filers sell securities, they do so at a higher price to minimize shareholder dilution. How often do companies that finance off the shelf do so at a price above where before the shelf was filed?

Of the 268 S-3 filings, 215 companies subsequently raised money. Slightly less than have half, or 94/215 (~44%), raised subsequent money at share prices higher than the share price at the time of the S-3 filing.  The range in share prices at the first financing varied dramatically, however. As can be seen in the plot in Figure 3, the range was -91.4% to +1,467%, the average change was +13.6%, but the mean was much lower at -8.7%, indicating the effect of positive outliers. Indeed, price decreases are limited to 100%, but share increases are theoretically limitless.

Figure 3

 

Lastly, @colinmagowan asked, “Did you track lead asset stage and disease, or say # of therapies in clinical trials when S-3 filed?”

I can see where the questioner is coming from; drug development costs vary by therapeutic areas. Thus, companies working in these areas may need to file larger shelves for more money. Further, the capital markets tend to value later stage assets more highly, as they are presumably closer to market. Late stage clinical trials cost more, too, so perhaps shelf filers and shelf size are related to stage of development.

I needed to go back and do some additional work for this question. To avoid the subjectivity of categorizing companies’ therapeutic area, I simply used the classification scheme put forth in each quarterly and yearly roundup issue of BioCentury. I realize that many readers do not have access to this industry publication, but suffice it to say that in these summary issues, the editors of BioCentury sort the majority of public biotech companies by therapeutic focus area. In Figure 4 are the data of S-3 filers, sorted by BioCentury classification, on shelf size and “implied dilution,” or the ratio of shelf size to market cap at filing. There may be hints of differences among companies focused on cardiovascular (CV) and pulmonary (Pulm.) regarding use of S-3s, but the sample sizes (Ns) are somewhat small in those categories. Otherwise, across therapeutic areas, it appears that implied dilution is in the 60-80% range on a shelf size of $50-$75 million dollars. (Recall that I define implied dilution as the ration of shelf size to market cap at the time of filing. The implied dilution is therefore a measure of the dilution that current shareholders would experience if all of the securities in the shelf were issued.)

Figure 4

So, putting it all together, I’d say the takeaways are:

  1. The immediate market sentiment to the filing of an S-3 statement tends to be slightly negative, as suggested by 1 day stock movements in the context of broader market movements. That said, the price changes are usually less than 10%, which a long-term investor can generally accept.
  2. Whether the S-3 filing company subsequently raises capital at higher prices is not predictable; roughly half of them do, half of them don’t, with wide variations in between. Clearly, companies thrive or struggle based on their unique prospects. Another reason to do your due diligence.
  3. Therapeutic area doesn’t seem to impact S-3 shelf size. However, this conclusion is based on small Ns in some cases and the categorization of companies by therapeutic area is difficult, as lead programs may change, they might be based on platform technology that is broadly-applicable, etc.

Adam Bristol

Alma As Example

Biotech entrepreneurs looking for new ways to start a company on the global stage may find the example of Alma Bio Therapeutics inspiring and instructive.

The start-up with a platform technology in the field of auto-immune and inflammatory diseases was established in December 2011 by Irun Cohen, a professor emeritus at Israel’s Weizmann Institute; Raanan Margalit, an expert in preclinical drug development; and Dr. Binah Baum, an experienced biotech executive who is well-networked in the European bio-community.

The three Israeli founders established their business in the Basel Biotech Incubator in Switzerland and financed a preclinical trial out of their own pockets. In doing so, they have shown it is possible to establish a company outside of one’s  home turf and get to proof-of-concept without relying on outside investors.

Baum explains the choice of the Swiss location as being related to access: several big pharmas that are likely candidates for collaboration are in that area or nearby in Germany, Austria and France. Also, the European venue increases the startup’s visibility among angels and private investors. In Israel, by contrast, she notes that VCs are primarily focused on medical devices rather than early stage biopharma, though she says it’s possible they might establish a presence in Israel later on.

The company’s IP is based on original research by Prof. Cohen at the Weizmann Institute. Several years ago, that IP was reassigned back to the inventor by the Institute’s technology transfer agency.

As a combined result of the previous and current studies, Alma has already obtained six major patents. The company chose inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) as its initial autoimmune indication. At a later stage, it plans to apply its platform to chronic pathological inflammatory diseases.

Alma’s technology is built around leveraging heat shock proteins (HSPs) that are implicated in the immune system’s control over inflammatory diseases. Discoveries made in this area by Prof. Cohen have already led to the development of a drug by Andromeda Biotech for Type I Diabetes; it is currently in Phase III.

Alma’s goal is to treat IBD in a curative and non-toxic manner by introducing heat shock proteins in the patient’s body that can regulate the level of inflammation in a controlled manner. Rather than use recombinant proteins, the HSPs are introduced through changes in the DNA coding.

The entrepreneurs note there is no disease-modifying therapy available for IBD, a condition currently attracting intensive R&D efforts in the pharmaceutical industry.

Upon reaching Phase I/II, Alma’s founders are confident that investors are likely to gain a relatively fast and high multiple return once a deal is made with a pharma company.

Bernard Dichek

The S-3 Barometer

Access to capital is essential for development-stage biotechs, yet the capital markets for public and private biotech companies are notoriously fragile. For private companies, venture investing in the life sciences has recovered from a rough patch in the ’08-’09 span to the robust financing environment in last year and a half. In the public markets, IPOs haven’t fully rebounded to historical levels, but follow-on financings and debt deals have been brisk as the biotech sector has performed extraordinarily well in 2012. Indeed, the NASDQ biotech index is up ~35% YTD at the end of the third quarter.

Public biotech companies have a mechanism, a shelf registration statement (or S-3, as it is known in SEC terminology), to register securities in advance of their issuance. The securities are “put on the shelf,” generally speaking, allowing them to be sold at any point within the 3-year lifespan of the shelf registration statement. One would think that having an active shelf registration on file is a must-half for public biotechs; they exist in a topsy-turvy macroeconomic environment compounded by the highs and lows of product development. Allowing them to raise money opportunistically and take advantage of strong capital markets or simply strong interest in their stock should be a good thing.

However, this is not the typical view. The filing of a shelf registration statement is often met with derision, and considered a bad omen that shareholder dilution is around the corner. If you follow any of the biotech stock watchers on Twitter, you know what I mean. My sense is that complaints arise primarily for three reasons:

  1. Investors seek to avoid dilution, and the issuance of new shares via draw downs from a shelf dilutes existing shareholders.
  2. Filing of an S-3 shelf registration signals to the market that a financing is forthcoming, thus creating an overhang on the stock, depressing its performance. In other words, why should big institutions buy shares in the open market if they can simply wait and buy in an upcoming follow-on financing?
  3. An active shelf is like a credit line for management that can be tapped at their discretion, so incentives are not fully aligned with shareholders if shelves are utilized haphazardly.

I don’t like dilution either, and I don’t like the artificial feel to the market cap increases that result from the issuance of more shares. But is there empirical support to the notion that S-3 filings predict subsequent financings? Is filing an S-3 a reflection of management and corporate strategy or a fact of life for R&D stage biotechs?

To address these questions, I looked at new shelf registration statements filed between Q2 2008 and Q2 2012 by US-based small cap biotech companies devoted to new drug discovery and drug development. I defined “small cap” as less than $1 billion, as this captures the vast majority of pre-commercial companies. I restricted the list to drug discovery and development companies because a) their value is largely “technology value” — the value ascribed to their development programs above the cash balance, and b) their cost of capital is heavily influenced by the perceived value of their technology.

During this period, I tallied 269 new shelf registration statements by 180 companies (some companies filed more than one, a replacement to an existing shelf that was either depleted or not). By my calculation, there are approximately 340 US-listed, small cap drug development companies in the sub-$1 billion range, so around 50% of these utilize shelf registration statements. Filing S-3s are not a universal capital-raising strategy.

But S-3 filers are a diverse group, with market caps at filing of between $11 million and $840 million. Further, the size of the shelf (that is, the total amount of capital that can be raised by the securities contained in the shelf) varied as well, though there was a slight trend for larger market cap companies to file larger S-3s. Of course, shareholders are interested in “implied dilution,” or the dilution that would occur if the entire shelf was drawn down. As expected, the implied dilution, or the ratio of the shelf size to market cap at filing, tends to be larger for small companies, but as shown in the figure (click to enlarge), there are some significant outliers. I assume that shelf size is related to the cost-intensiveness of future development plans, but perhaps I’m giving management too much credit. 

Is an S-3 filing a harbinger of a near-term financing? The data say: Yes. Of the 269 shelves, 207 (77%) have raised money. Of those 244 S-3s filed before January 1, 2012, that number rises to 82% (199 of 244). If one excludes those companies that were acquired with an active shelf in place (e.g., ISTA, ANDS, INHX, CLDA, ISPH, ADLR, MITI, PRX, PPCO), the number is closer to 85%.

The average time to the first financing was 207 days, with a median of 240 days. The magnitude of the first drawdown covered the full range, from 1% of the shelf to the full 100%. As shown in the figure, the majority of the first financings raised 50% or less of the full shelf value.

 

Taken together, the data around S-3s in recent years, a period of economic hardship, indicate that:

  1. Only about half of small cap therapeutics companies file shelf registrations
  2. For those that do, the overwhelming majority utilize them, usually in about 6 months
  3. The first drawn down is usually 50% of the shelf or less, which could give shareholders an estimate of the extent of dilution at a first raise.

Of course, as I noted above, raising money is a necessity for biotech, so noting here that they do, via the shelf mechanism, is somewhat self-evident; if a company files a shelf, why not use it? More important is when and how.  Ideally, shelves are utilized at opportunities when share price is high. Remember that S-3 remain active for three years, so market cap at the time of shelf drawn downs is perhaps a more important metric than market cap at the time of filing. If share price rises (and so market cap) during that time, the implied dilution would decrease.  These are questions to explore in future posts.

I should note that, in the process of compiling these data, I put together a fairly extensive spreadsheet with numerous metrics related to S-3 filers, such as stock performance, extent of insider holdings, estimated runway at the time of filing/draw-down, share price at first raise, etc. If any readers are interested in a particular question, please let me know in the comments below or via direct message on Twitter and I’ll see if I can address it with my database.

Adam Bristol

Non-Dilutive Financing for Biotech Startups

In a series of posts we introduced the Leverage Startup and how non-dilutive sources of capital can be used to accelerate the commercialization of academic biotech projects.  In this post we discuss the use and sources of non-dilutive financing in biotech startups.

We define non-dilutive funding as financing that does not require the sale of your company’s shares, and hence does not cause dilution of the existing shareholders.  The use of non-dilutive funds as a component of your financing strategy is important and has many benefits.  First, non-dilutive funds can provide critical cash to support your company’s development.  Second, because non-dilutive funds do not require the sale of the company’s voting equity, it allows founding teams and existing shareholders to retain company ownership and control.  Third, as many non-dilutive funding sources require approval from expert stakeholders with deep domain knowledge like funding agencies, important validation of the team and technology can be provided for future customers, partners, and equity investors.

The following gives an overview of non-dilutive sources.

Government research grants. (for example: NIH).  Certain research focused government grants include companies as eligible awardees.  The National Institute of Health (NIH) is a good example, where companies can compete for R01 and R21 grants alongside traditional University applicants. These government research grants typically fund basic research or its commercial translation, with the required stage of development clearly outlined in the call for proposals. Such monies typically fund salary and consumables, but limit their contribution of overhead or other non-research activities.

Government industry grants (for example: SBIR, NRC IRAP).  With the aim of enabling the commercialization of cutting edge technologies, various governments have established industry specific grant programs.  These grants typically emphasize the commercialization of research and the application often requires a strong market argument for the future product.  These grants usually fund commercialization activities rather than basic research and sometimes can be partially used to support the filing of intellectual property, conducing a market analysis, and other business development actives.  Many of these funds require the company involved to provide matching funds in the form of in kind (i.e. additional salary support) or cash, and to demonstrate that the business will provide a conduit for commercialization.

Foundations (for example: Gates, CF, Ellison, Lou Gehrigs, X Prize).  Foundations are becoming an increasingly important driver of biotechnology innovation. Foundations are typically focused on improving the health of individuals inflicted with a specific disease, for example the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, and are primarily funded by donors with a connection to the ailment.  To increase the research being conducted for the given indication as well as the effectiveness of that research, Foundations are taking a very pro-active approach to funding R&D.  For companies, this can represent a significant opportunity to obtain R&D funds to push forward a technology that can impact a given disease. In addition, Foundations also provide a conduit to clinical expertise as well as potential access to patients and stakeholders, giving a program a larger chance of translational success.  There are also new initiatives specifically focused on biotechnology entrepreneurship.  For instance, Breakout Labs, an initiative from the Thiel Foundation, has been set-up to bridge the gap between early-stage research and venture capital-ready technologies.

Industry partnerships.  Industry partnerships are the life blood for pre-revenue biotech firms. Typically, partnerships involve a transfer of technology from a small biotech to a large company in return for cash and/or co-development rights.  These partnerships can involve significant sums of upfront and downstream cash flows and often represent the first major validation of the technology by an established pharma or large biotechnology company. Although these funds usually do not involve an equity stake in the selling company, such transactions usually involve a license or option-to-license of the selling firms intellectual property.  It is important to keep such licenses non-exclusive or narrowly-exclusive such that the startup remains positioned for long term growth.

Venture Debt (for example: Silicon Valley Bank). Venture debt is a useful tool in Biotech financing.  For example, debt can be utilized to extend the runway of an existing financing round to allow the company reach critical proof-of-concept achievements prior to follow on investments.  A financing round is usually required before accessing Venture Debt, and the lenders are anticipating that the company will raise another financing round or other capital injection to receive their payback.  Lastly, as with all debt, there is insolvency risk associated with it and careful consideration is required before taking such funds.

Revenue (for example: contract research, early product release).  Building a company on the back of a successful revenue stream is an ideal financing approach, however this can be challenging for nascent ventures.  For biotech firms will little to no regulatory involvement (i.e. tools companies, certain medical devices, industrial applications, etc.), establishing customers to use and test early prototype products is feasible and recommended.  For firms with significantly more regulatory barriers (i.e. therapeutic, diagnostic, etc.) revenue can sometimes be generated through auxiliary products or services, for example contract research or consulting.  In these cases however, the founding team needs to be diligent to not be distracted from the ultimate product goal of the firm and needs to weight the value of these funds over the delays it will create in achieving overall long-term goals.

Although non-dilutive sources are a great way to finance an early stage biotech, it should be noted that they are not “free” and can have important implications and associated costs.  For instance, certain funding agencies require that the invested cash be returned if the company is acquired by a foreign company, that they receive a multiple of their investment upon commercial success, or that they have certain rights to the IP.  Additionally, non-dilutive funds are typically allocated to a given project, rather than to the company at large.  As such non-dilutive funds are more ridged to business pivots that require a change in a said project, and do not fund other business development and overhead of running your business. A combination of dilutive and non-dilutive financing is often the strongest mix for early biotech.

Thanks to Euan Ramsay  & Mike Koeris for edits and input on the post.  This post was originally posted on BiotechStart.org.  Please provide any insights you may have to the use of non-dilutive funds, and sources of non-dilutive funds in countries outside of North America.

James Taylor

 

BIO 2012: Development cost comparison, China vs. US

I attended BIO this year, and while there I felt responsible for China as a Trade Secrets contributor, so I settled in at “The China Day” – a day-long program organized around China, and was happy to take down some interesting numbers from the morning session.

Two domestic Chinese biotech companies shared their development stories. Beijing Continent Pharmaceuticals and Beta pharmaceuticals have a lot in common – both started 10 years ago from discovery research, both developed pipeline in specific therapeutic areas, and both got their first innovative drug approved by Chinese SFDA last year. There are not many Chinese biotech companies who had gone through the drug development and approval process, so their perspective offered some valuable insights.

According to Ying Luo, chairman of Beijing Continent pharmaceuticals, his company’s development experience was that China costs about 1/3 to 1/2 less than the US at the discovery stage, with the pre-IND cost in China being between US$600,000 to US$1 million.

The cost of clinical trials between US and China were estimated as following:

China (million, USD) U.S. (million, USD)
Phase I 0.3 – 0.8 3-5
Phase II 2-3 20-50
Phase III 3-7 60-300

 

Mr. Luo pointed out that the cost saving in China seemed not significant at the early stage but obvious at the clinical trial stage. This seems especially true at phase III, where the cost could be 10- to 20-fold less than that is in the United States. (Continent pharmaceuticals has its own in-house clinical development team.)

Beta pharmaceuticals started 10 years ago by screening for  EGFR- Tyrosine kinase inhibitors based on Gefitinib (Iressa) and Tarceva’s molecular structure. In early 2000, Beta discovered Icotinib. Mr. Xinxiang  Wang,  CEO of Beta pharma, said that they were able to develop Icotinib with a relatively small team, by efficiently using contract research organizations. The trial was double-blinded and multicenter, comparing Icotinib and Gefitinib in advanced non-small cell lung cancer. It involved 500+ patients, and, thanks to the large number of hospitals involved, the total recruitment time was only 11 months.  He said that they spent about 60 million RMB (US$7+ million) in Icotinib’s phase III trial.

This number is low – their full China clinical development program could be less than $11 million. Globally, 10 years and $1 billion has been the price tag of a new molecular entity, though people say it is getting longer and more expensive.

I caught up to Mr. Luo in the hall way and asked about this large difference in cost.

Luo was friendly and stressed that trials are different by drug, size, protocol and patient number, so one cannot generalize the cost. In addition, his numbers are not from a comprehensive poll, but individual experiences of his company and his peers. “But innovative biotech companies are rare in China, maybe not more than a dozen,” he said.

Global pharmas in China usually use global CROs, and the statistics I quoted before may come mostly from global multicenter trials. In which case, part of the cost reduction by Chinese companies might come because “global CROs are a lot more expensive than local CROs… global multicenter trials are a lot more expensive than local trials… “ Luo said.

Another contributing factor to the cost difference in the clinical trial may pertain to the number of patients tested, Luo pointed out. Global pharmas usually conduct several phase III trials globally on one drug candidate, each ranging from a few hundred to a couple thousand patients. In China, there is a requirement on the patient number for phase III trials, which is to have statistical significance and with minimum 300 patients on the test arm.

Beta pharma’s 10 years development seems to have created a blockbuster in China. The product was launched in August 2011. Sales reached RMB 100 million in February 2012, and is projected to reach one billion RMB by 2016. Mr. Wang said Beta is preparing to file FDA approval in the United States.

Chloe Liu

The ‘Enemy’ Report

Earlier this month the Kauffman Foundation released an in-depth analysis of its own investing in ~100 venture capital (VC) funds over some 20 years. The report is not specific to the life sciences, but that hardly matters in this case, partially because investing in tech and/or biotech carries certain similarities, and partially because it’s a fascinating read anyway.

The report basically concludes that the limited partner model is broken (Kauffman invests as an LP). Using that terminology got a lot of play, as did the title of the report: We have met the enemy…and he is us.  There are plenty of interesting talking points in the report, and lots of data to ponder: for example, 62 of the 100 funds Kauffman invested in and examined did not provide returns that exceeded the public markets, after considering fees and carry. They also found that smaller funds provided better returns.

There’s more, but it ends by saying that while the Foundation will continue to invest in venture capital, it will take a more guarded, restricted approach. It will be more selective, the reports says, and will have a long-term relationship with just five to 10 venture capital partnerships.

This has opened up plenty of dialogue, via podcasts and bloggers and video and articles.  Bruce Booth gives his mostly concurring thoughts here, particularly insightful because he tailors his comments to biotech.

At 51 pages, it’s not something you can breeze through over a cup of coffee, but it was well worth my time.  You can download it here.

Brady Huggett